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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)Q).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The issues presented on appeal are not adequately or accurately stated in Appellant
BRAVE's Statement of Issues Presented for Review. Therefore CPB Development, LC
and Mount Holly Partners, LLC (hereafter "Landowners") offer the following statements
of the issues and standards of review:
1. Whether the Landowners are estopped from asserting that Beaver County
Ordinance No. 2007-04 approving a Development Agreement between the Landowners
and Beaver County is a non-referable administrative action under the test set forth in
Citizen *s Awareness Now v. Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1994).
Standard of review:

Estoppel, particularly in this context, presents a mixed

question of law and fact to which the Court grants significant deference. See Glew v.
Ohio Savings Bank, 2007 UT 56, ^ 18, 181 P.3d 791. The Court will not disturb the trial
court's factual findings upon a bench trial unless clearly erroneous. Id.
2. Whether the notices provided for the April 2, 2007, public meeting satisfied the
notice requirements of Marakis.
Standard of review: Whether notice was adequate is a question of law reviewed
for correctness, but the Court gives deference to the factual findings upon which the trial
court based its decision. See Low v. City ofMonticello, 2004 UT 90, ^ 11, 103 P.3d 130.
Because the trial court found the facts presented here upon a bench trial, the Court will
1
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not disturb them unless clearly erroneous. Glew, 2007 UT 56 at Tf 18.
3. Whether the trial court correctly held that Ordinance No. 2007-04's approval of
a private Development Agreement is a non-referable administrative action under the
standard set forth in Marakis.
Standard of review:

This issue presents a "fact-intensive analysis," Mouty v.

Sandy City Recorder, 2005 UT 41, \ 24 & n. 9, 122 P.3d 521, that is entitled to
substantial deference particularly where, as here, the facts were found upon a bench trial,
Glew, 2007 UT 56 at f 18. The Court should not disturb the findings and conclusions of
the trial court unless clearly erroneous. Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
The Beaver County General Plan. See Addendum, Exhibit A.
Zoning Ordinance of Beaver County, Chapter 10.09. See Addendum, Exhibit B.
Zoning Ordinance of Beaver County, Chapter 10.23. See Addendum, Exhibit C.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Landowners hereby adopt and incorporate by reference the "Statement of the
Case" submitted by the Beaver County Appellees on pages 3-4 of their brief with the
correction that the ex parte temporary restraining order was actually sought and obtained
by a group of homeowners and homeowners associations in the referenced companion
case—not BRAVE. (R. at 4228-4408, 4451, 4454.)

2
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

General Timeline of Events and Procedural History.

1.

This case arises out of the effect and validity of a Development Agreement

between Beaver County, a political subdivision of the state of Utah, and the Landowners.
(R. at 1887.)
2.

The Landowners, Mount Holly Partners, LLC, and CPB Development, LC,

are, respectively, the landowner and developer of a long-term, mixed-use, 1,826-acre,
master-planned project known as "Mt. Holly Club" that is proposed to be constructed in
several separate planned phases and subdivisions over an extended period of time. (R. at
1887.)

Mt. Holly Club includes a proposed ski resort, golf course and multiple

residences. (Pis.' Trial Ex. 16 at 1.)
3.

A portion of the land that Mount Holly and CPB seeks to develop has

previously been used as a ski resort. (R. at 1916, 1923.) Historically, some of the
property in question had received concept plan approval by the Beaver County Planning
Commission for uses similar in density and nature to that proposed by Mount Holly and
CPB, with the exception of the golf course, which was not previously proposed. (Id.)
Also, a portion of the property had been conceptually approved for residential
development with allowed densities greater than the densities contemplated by the
Landowners. (Id.)
4.

Mount Holly and CPB are only developing a fraction of the total acreage.

All of the undeveloped acreage will remain "open space." (R. at 1921 n. 25.)

3
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5.

Mount Holly and CPB obtained approval of a Concept Plan for Mount

Holly Club on November 15, 2006, from the Beaver County Planning Commission. (R.
at 1887.) One of the Planning Commission's conditions for approval was the adoption of
a comprehensive Development Agreement.

(R. at 1887.)

On March 21, 2007, the

Planning Commission conducted a public hearing to receive public comment and input
on the proposed Mount Holly Club Development Agreement. (R. at 1887.)
6.

This was the first public hearing to consider the adoption or modification of

a Development Agreement pertaining to Mount Holly Club. The parties stipulated at trial
on Friday, June 22, 2007, that the notice provided for the March 21, 2007, hearing was
not defective and constituted legally sufficient and adequate notice for that meeting. (R.
at 1892.)
7.

The March 21, 2007, Planning Commission hearing was well attended and

generated much public interest and input. (See Intervenors' Trial Ex. 4.) After closing
the hearing, including an approximately week-long written public comment period, the
Planning Commission worked to formulate a recommendation to the Beaver County
Board of County Commissioners for the proposed Mount Holly Club Development
Agreement. (R. at 1888.)
8.

The Planning Commission held a public meeting on Wednesday, March 28,

2007. No public comment was taken at the meeting. Shortly before that meeting, a new
draft of the Development Agreement was made available to the Planning Commissioners
which contained numerous changes from the first draft. The Planning Commission voted
on March 28 to make additional modifications to the second draft. (R. at 1893.)
4
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9.

After the March 28, 2007, meeting Bruce Parker, a land use planning

consultant retained by Beaver County, prepared a revised Development Agreement
incorporating the changes voted on by the Planning Commission. This was the third
public draft of the Development Agreement. This draft, which was to be the subject of
the April 2, 2007, County Commission meeting, was not completed until Friday
afternoon, March 30, 2007, and was not available on Beaver County's website until late
that day. Several individuals who attended the April 2, 2007, public meeting had not
seen the March 30 draft. (R. at 1894.)
10.

The Beaver County Commissioners conducted a public hearing for the

announced purpose of receiving comment and input on the Planning Commission's
recommendation for the Mount Holly Club Development Agreement on April 2, 2007.
(R. at 1888.) Notice of the April 2, 2007, meeting had been posted in at least three public
locations within the county on March 16, 2007—specifically, the Beaver County
courthouse, and the Minersville and Milford City Halls. Beaver County also published
notice of the April 2 hearing in The Beaver Press, a newspaper of general circulation in
the area on March 22 and 29, 2007. (See Defs.' Trial Exs. 2-4; Pis.' Trial Ex. 8; R. at
1892-93.) Beaver County had posted drafts of the Development Agreement to its official
website as they became available and had otherwise made copies available to the public
in advance of each hearing and/or meeting throughout the public review process. (See,
e.g., Intervenors' Trial Exs. 13-14; see also Pis.' Trial Exs. 12-15.)
11.

No one testified at trial that they did not receive notice of the April 2

meeting, (see generally Trial Transcript), including BRAVE, which was a group of
5
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activists organized with a calling network to keep local citizens informed about the
Landowners' development and which had representatives in attendance at the relevant
meetings. (R. at 2093, pp. 65-66, 73-75, 88:19-24.) BRAVE's president testified that
BRAVE "had called a great percentage" of the people who showed up at the public
hearings and public meetings. (R. at 209, p. 74:2.)
12.

There was also no testimony offered from any witness suggesting that the

published and posted notices, themselves, were somehow misleading or inadequate.
Further there was no evidence presented at trial to show that the public comment on the
Development Agreement might have been different if the third public draft of the
Development Agreement first posted on Beaver County's website on March 30, 2007,
would have been made available to the public any earlier. (R. at 1896.) All of the
changes made and incorporated into the third public draft had been voted on at the public
meeting held on March 28, 2007, before the Planning Commission. (R. at 1896.)
13.

The minutes of the April 2 County Commission meeting indicate that it was

well-attended. (See Intervenors' Trial Ex. 18.) At least 63 people were in attendance.
(R. at 1894.) The April 2 meeting minutes also reflect that the Commission announced
that written public comment would be accepted until Monday, April 9, 2007, at 12:00
noon. (See Intervenors' Trial Ex. 18, p.3.) At least 200 written comments were received
and reviewed by the County and/or the County's consultant. (R. at 1894.)
14.

The County Commission considered the public oral comment and written

input received, (R. 1888), and thereafter made changes to the Planning Commission's
prior Development Agreement draft. (R. 1888.)
6
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15.

On April 16, 2007, the Beaver County Board of County Commissioners

publicly approved the text, language, exhibits, and other materials associated with the
Mount Holly Club Development Agreement and directed its consultant, Mr. Parker, to
make the necessary changes and prepare a final draft of the Development Agreement. (R.
1888.)
16.

On April 25, 2007, CPB and Mount Holly executed a document entitled "A

Development Agreement for Mount Holly Club, Located Within Beaver County, Utah
and Including the Mount Holly Club Site Development Plan," hereinafter referred to as
the "Development Agreement." (R. 1888.)
17.

On April 30, 2007, the County Commission enacted Ordinance No. 2007-

04 authorizing the County to enter into the Development Agreement. (R. 1888.) The
Development Agreement was attached to Ordinance No. 2007-04 as a separate but
referenced document. (R. 1889.)

Thereafter, Donald J. Willden, Chair of the Beaver

County Board of County Commissioners, executed the Development Agreement. (Pis.'
Trial Ex. 16 at 3.) (R. at 1889.)
18.

On May 1, 2007, BRAVE filed its Complaint in Civil No. 070500036 and

Plaintiffs Snowflake Homeowners Association, Inc., Holly Ridge Condominium
Association, Mt. Holly Condominium Association, Mt. Holly Village Condominium,
Four Seasons Condominium Association, Eric J. Miller, Jennifer Christensen, Bruce
Badia and Sterling Jckowski (hereinafter referred to as "Homeowners" and collectively
referred to with "BRAVE" as "Plaintiffs") filed their Complaint in Civil No. 070500037.
(R. 1898; R. at 3006.)
7
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19.

On May 2, 2007, BRAVE filed an administrative appeal related to the

actions of Beaver County, the County Commission, and the Planning Commission in
connection with the Development Agreement. (Pis.' Trial Ex. 18; R. at 1898.) The
Landowners did not intervene in and were not a party to BRAVE's appeal.
20.

On May 7, the County Commission sent a letter to BRAVE stating:

Regarding your appeal of the development agreement, we hereby
acknowledge that you have exhausted your administrative remedies. . . .
[T]here is no Board of Adjustment in existence in Beaver County, and even
if there were a Board of Adjustment it appears that it could not hear the
appeal because it lacks authority to grant the relief you are requesting. By
ordinance, the Board of Adjustment cannot hear challenges to the
enactment of an ordinance; rather it may only hear appeals from (1)
decisions applying the zoning ordinance, (2) special exceptions to the terms
of the zoning ordinance, (3) variances from the terms of the zoning
ordinance, and (4) determinations of nonconforming buildings and uses.
See Beaver County Ordinance § 10.04.040.
For that reason, your appeal of the Development Agreement was in effect
summarily denied on the basis of a lack of jurisdiction, and its ripeness in
being filed prior to the formal enactment of the ordinance. Unfortunately,
the proper forum for resolving the dispute appears to be in the District
Court.
(R. at 1898-99; Pis.' Trial Ex. 20.)
21.

On May 10, 2007, Beaver County caused a "NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF

ORDINANCE" to be published in The Beaver Press, which is a newspaper published and
having general circulation in Beaver County. (Trial Ex. Dl; R. at 1889, 1897.) That
same day, at least 12-13 individuals purporting to be residents of Beaver County
requested applications for Referendum Petitions from the Beaver County Clerk that
"Ordinance No. 2007-04[] ... be referred to the voters for their approval or rejection at the

8
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regular general election to be held on November 4, 2008." {See Pis.' Trial Ex. 1; R.
1889.)
22.

Ordinance No. 2007-04 took effect on May 15, 2007. (Pis.' Ex. 16 at 3; R.

at 1889.) On May 18, 2007, the Homeowners filed an Amended Complaint in Civil No.
07050037 and BRAVE filed its Amended Complaint in Civil No. 070500036. (R. at 421,
1889-90; R. at 3436.)1 Both Amended Complaints sought a declaration that Ordinance
2007-04 would not take effect until after being subjected to a referendum vote. (R. at
1890.)
23.

On Friday, May 25, 2007, District Court Judge Michael Westfall issued a

temporary restraining order enjoining Beaver County from giving any effect to Ordinance
No. 2007-04 until a referendum vote could take place. (R. at 1890; R. at 4451.)
24.

By May 29, 2007, the referendum sponsors had submitted to the County

Clerk 653 referendum signatures. (Pis.' Trial Ex. 5 at 1-2; R. at 1891.) That same day,
CPB and Mt. Holly filed a motion to intervene. (R. at 1008.)
25.

Judge Westfall recused himself on June 6, 2007, and the case was assigned

to Judge John J. Walton, who later that day conducted a telephonic conference with the
parties to discuss the status of the rapidly-moving case. Counsel for BRAVE indicated
that BRAVE did not oppose the intervention of CPB and Mount Holly as Intervenor
Defendants, (R. at 1609-10; see also R. at 1598), but, due to the objection of the

1

The Plaintiffs sued Beaver County, the Beaver County Planning Commission and
the Beaver County Board of County Commissioners but not the Beaver County Clerk or
the Landowners. The two actions were later consolidated pursuant to a stipulation
between Beaver County and Plaintiffs. (R. at 1890.)
9
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Homeowners, a hearing on the motion to intervene was set for June 13, 2007. (R. at
1552.)
26.

By June 11 the referendum sponsors had obtained 845 signatures. (Pis.'

Trial Ex. 5 at 1-2; R. at 1891.)
27.

On June 13, 2007, the Court granted the Landowners' motion to intervene

and held a conference with counsel in chambers. After mutually agreeing to an expedited
trial of the issues relating to the referability of the Development Agreement, the parties
stipulated in open court at the June 13, 2007, hearing that an expedited trial would be
held on June 21-22, 2007, to address the following issues:
a.
Was the notice provided for the public meeting held on April
2, 2007, proper?
b.
Was the May 10, 2007, notice of the adoption of Ordinance
2007-04 proper?
c.
Is Ordinance 2007-04 subject to a referendum vote under the
standard set forth in Citizen's Awareness Now v. Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117
(Utah 1994)?
d.
If Ordinance 2007-04 is subject to a referendum vote, does
Ordinance 2007-04 remain in effect or does it not take effect until
completion of a referendum vote?
(R. at 1598-99, 1891.)2
28.

BRAVE did not raise the issue of judicial or equitable estoppel in its

pleadings, (see R. at 1, 421-445 & 1632), in the June 13, 2007, pre-trial stipulation and
order, (R. at 1598-99), or in its Trial Memorandum, (R. at 1632-44). The Homeowners'

2

This stipulation was embodied in a pre-trial order that is reflected in a trial court
minute entry.
10
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counsel stated in the June 13, 2007, open-court stipulation that plaintiffs believed the
County had made an admission that its actions were legislative but Plaintiffs' counsel did
not suggest that the theory of estoppel (judicial or equitable) would be asserted. (159899.) The Homeowners—not BRAVE—asserted the theory of estoppel for the first time
in their Trial Memorandum, which was filed two days before trial. (R. at 1647-52.)
29.

The trial court conducted a two-day bench trial on June 21-22, 2007. (R. at

1886-87.) It issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on July 26,
2007. (R. at 1886, 1993.)
30.

The Homeowners voluntarily dismissed their claims and were dismissed

from the case on October 16, 2007. (R. at 2086-87). BRAVE is the only remaining
plaintiff. (Id.)
B.

Facts Relating to the Interaction of the Development Agreement
approved by Ordinance 2007-04 with the Beaver County
Comprehensive Plan and Existing Ordinances.

31.

Beaver County has had a General Plan since at least 1993. (R. at 1904.) Its

General Plan was updated in 1997 and again in 1999. The County refers to its General
Plan as its "comprehensive plan." (R. at 1904.) Under the heading "Emergence of
Beaver County's General Plan," the General Plan states as follows:
Faced with issues such as solid waste disposal, Federal and State Land
Management Plans, and the need for aggressive economic development,
the County Commission has concentrated the efforts of its Planning and
Zoning Commission to address growth and development issues and derive
specific County goals. The "Common bond" that will take The County
Commission as well as future Commission's [sic] to the year 2020 is the
best utilization of Beaver County's private land which only constitutes 6.1%
of the County's entire land base. It will be important to the elected, as well
as appointed officials to strive at minimizing the limitations resulting from
11
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the high percentages of Federal and State Lands, by not diminishing
development interest and quality growth. Their continued leadership will
assure growth, and further enhance the communities within the County.
(Pis.5 Trial Ex. 34 at H-6 (emphasis added); R. at 1904.)
32.

The General Plan lists economic goals and policies of the County. One of

the goals is to "[sjerve existing and new economic growth by pursuing timely and
equitable strategies to provide financing of basic infrastructure." (Pis.' Trial Ex. 34 at E67.)

One of the policies of this goal is to "[m]ake use of plans and development

agreements which specify the nature, timing, cost, and financing mechanisms to be used
to fund improvements and services." {Id. at 2.1 (emphasis added); R. at 1904-05.)
33.

The County benefits secured from the Landowners through use of the

Development Agreement in this case are set out in Part F of the Development Agreement
and, include, but are not limited to, paying "all costs associated with the installation of a
jet fuel dispensing facility at the Beaver Municipal Airport, at no expense to Beaver City
Corporation," establishing a K-12 ski program for school children, providing funds
"sufficient to allow the County to proceed to update the Beaver County General Plan,
including the General Plan's ... Moderate Income Housing Element," and funds to allow
the County to update its land use ordinances, including the Zoning Ordinance,
Subdivision Ordinance, and Land Use Application Forms." (Pis.' Trial Ex. 16 at 45-46;
R. at 1915.)
34.

The General Plan also reflects "the County's commitment to quality Public

and Private Growth through their elected and appointed officials. This document also
provides the direction and guidelines to all involved in furthering the efforts of making
12
4837-9492-6850/CP001 -004

Beaver County a viable and dynamic 21st century county." (Pis.' Trial Exhibit 34 at H-6
(emphasis added).)
35.

The Plans and Programs section of the General Plan states that "Projected

land use is the backbone of the General Plan." (Pis.' Trial Exhibit 34 at P&P-70.)
36.

The General Plan further provides that "New subdivisions, if approved, will

be required to provide adequate culinary water and adequate means of sanitary sewage
disposal. Such developments should be required to take measures which will mitigate
environmental impacts and should be designed so as not to detract from the visual quality
of the area.
differing

The county will modify its land-use ordinances to accommodate the

needs

and

limitations

of

standard

residential

subdivisions

and

mountain/recreation residential subdivisions." (Id. at P&P-71 (emphasis added).)
37.

The policies favoring the "need for aggressive economic development" and

"quality growth," (R. at 1904; Pis.' Trial Ex. 34 at H-6), the need to make use of "plans
and development agreements," (R. at 1904-05; Pis.' Trial Ex. 34 at E-67), and the policy
to "modify its land-use ordinances to accommodate the differing needs and limitations of
... mountain/recreation residential subdivisions" which were embodied in the General
Plan found expression in Beaver County's zoning ordinances. (Pis.' Trial Ex. 34 at P&P71.)
38.

As with most counties and political subdivisions in the State of Utah,

Beaver County has zoning ordinances which define the different types of approved uses
for land lying within county boundaries. (See generally Pis.' Trial Ex. 25.)

13
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39.

Mt. Holly Club falls within Beaver County's ''Planned District Zone (P)" or

"F'Zone. (R. at 1902.)
40.

The stated purpose of the P zone is, "To allow the diversification of land

uses as they relate to each other in a physical and environmental arrangement, at the same
time, ensuring compliance with the provisions of this ordinance." (Pis.' Trial Ex. 25 at
92, § 10.23.010; R. at 1902.)
41.

The "Purpose" section of the P zone also states that it "is only to be used in

conjunction with the Planned Unit Development regulations,'1 see id., and, consistent
therewith, there are no stated Use Regulations or stated Permitted Uses with respect to
this zone. (R. at 1902-03 (emphasis added).)
42.

In turn, the stated purpose of the Planned Unit Development chapter of the

zoning ordinance is stated to "allow diversification in the relationship of various uses and
structures to their sites and to permit more flexibility in the use of such sites." (Pis.'
Trial Ex. 25 at 40, § 10.09.010 (emphasis added).)
43.

The definition of a "planned unit development" is an "integrated design for

development of residential, commercial, or industrial uses, or combinations of such uses,
in which one (1) or more of the regulations, other than use regulations, of the district in
which the development is to be situated is waived or varied to allow flexibility... in
accordance with an approved plan and imposed general requirements as specified in this
Chapter." {Id. at 40, § 10.09.020 (emphasis added); R. at 1903-04, 1917.)
44.

Based upon the trial court's review of the foregoing language, in

conjunction with the testimony of live witnesses and the evidence adduced at trial, it
14
4837-9492-6850/CP001 -004

concluded that the general purpose and policy of the overall zoning scheme that was
applicable to the subject property and that existed in Beaver County at the time of
enactment of Ordinance No. 2007-04 was "( a ) to allow for diversification of land uses as
they relate to each other in a physical and environmental arrangement (b) to allow for any
combination of uses that may be determined by the Planning Commission to be in
harmony with each other according to a designated and approved development plan (c) to
permit flexibility through the use of planned and integrated designs and (d) to serve
existing and promote new quality growth by pursuing timely and equitable strategies to
provide financing for basic infrastructure through, among other things, the use of
development agreements." (R. at 1918.)
45.

County Commissioner Chad Johnson and the County's consultant, Mr.

Parker, testified that the intent of the Development Agreement approved by Ordinance
2007-04 was to implement these existing policies under the existing zoning scheme. (R.
at 1915; R. at 2092, Trial Transcript, Vol. II at 370 & 439-40.) This testimony was not
refuted.
46.

The trial court found that any waivers or variations of P Zone regulations or

various adjustments to approval processes and timing in the Development Agreement
were expressly contemplated by § 10.09.020 of the Beaver County Zoning Ordinance.
(R. at 1915.)
47.

There are 24 uses permitted under the Development Agreement. (R. at

1919 & n. 24.) Through the Development Agreement approval process, the Planning
Commission and the County Commission reviewed and allowed each one of these 24
15
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uses as "PROJECT PLAN ALLOWED USES" under the Development Agreement.
(Pis.' Trial Ex. 16 at 66-73, Ex. E.) The trial court found that "permitted uses are allowed
in the P Zone where the prohibition against them is waived. As is evident from the
identification of 24 permitted uses in Ordinance 2007-04, the prohibition has been
waived here." (R. at 1920.)
48.

The trial court found that the 24 permitted uses under the Development

Agreement did not constitute material or substantive changes but largely consisted of
alterations in the timing and procedures for approval. (Pis.' Trial Ex. 16 at 78-84, Ex. H1.) The trial court found, rather than having the uses approved as conditional uses by the
Planning Commission, "Under this procedure, 'the Zoning Administrator [and not the
Planning Commission or the BOCC] is authorized to review and approve or deny all
Permitted Use Applications for all uses identified as a Permitted Use by Exhibit E [to the
Development Agreement].'" (Id. at 78, Ex. H-1, Section 2; R. at 1905.) The developer
still must apply for development approvals in the future, which may be granted or denied
by the County-appointed zoning authority. (Id.) The Development Agreement simply
altered who approves the contemplated use. (See also R. at 1905.)
49.

Plaintiffs offered evidence at trial of the alleged conflicts and textual

differences between specific provisions of the Development Agreement, the Beaver
County Zoning Ordinance, the Subdivision Ordinance and other ordinances. However,
the trial court found that the alleged conflicts centered on the particulars of how the
Development Agreement worked in relation to the existing ordinances and not on the
"general" purposes and policies as required by Marakis. (R. at 1921.)
16
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50.

The trial court concluded, "Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that any of

these modifications represent changes to the overall purpose and policy of the existing
Zoning Ordinance. With regard to identifying structure arrangements (including lot area,
width, yard height, density, and coverage regulations), fencing and screening
requirements, and demonstrating water rights, only the timing requirements were varied."
(R. at 1921.)3 The substance of those requirements remained in tact. (R. at 1922.) The
trial court found that "[t]he other changes are similarly procedural in nature. Although
the Zoning Ordinance and Subdivision Ordinance have undoubtedly been amended in the
particulars noted by Plaintiffs, the general purpose and policy of these ordinances remain
materially unaffected by the various amendments." (R. at 1921.)
51.

The trial court found that "nothing of substance is permitted under

Ordinance 2007-04 that is not contemplated by the existing Zoning Ordinance." (R. at
1922.)

3

For example, Part G, Section 28, of the Development Agreement, governing
"APPLICABLE DEVELOPMENT STANDARDS" acknowledges that "Chapter 10.09
Zoning Ordinance, 'Planned Unit Development,'" as adopted on the date of execution of
this Agreement establishes various requirements and standards applicable to
developments located in a Planned District Zone." (Pis. Trial Ex. 16 at p. 47, § 28.) Part
G, Section 28, Tf 2 then provides, "Because of the nature of the proposed Development
for the Project Area, the requirements of Section 10-09.040(4)(a), Section 10090.040(4)(b), and Section 10-09.040(4)(c) and including the requirements and standards
for maximum density or land use intensity, arrangement of buildings and structures, lot
area, width, yard, building height, and coverage limits shall be identified at the time a
Land Use Application is approved by a County Land Use Authority, as applicable."
(Id. (emphasis added).) Part G, Section 28, ^f 4, similarly provides, "Because of the nature
of the proposed Development for the Project Area, the standards for landscaping, fencing,
and screening related to uses shall be identified at the time of a Land Use Application is
approved by a County Land Use Authority, as applicable." (7tf. (emphasis added).)
17
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52.

The trial court also found that the Development Agreement did not cause a

material variance from the county's comprehensive plan because the "the property in
question previously had been granted concept plan approval by the Planning Commission
for uses similar in density and nature to that proposed under the Development
Agreement, with the exception of Intervenors' proposed golf course. A portion of the
property had previously been used as a ski resort and had previously been conceptually
approved for residential development with allowed densities greater than the densities
contemplated by the Development Agreement." (R. at 1923-24.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
BRAVE contends that the Landowners were estopped or otherwise prohibited
from asserting at trial that the Development Agreement approved by Ordinance 2007-04
was "administrative" under the Marakis test, but this argument fails at multiple levels.
First, the Landowners are not automatically bound by the estoppel of Beaver County, as
BRAVE seems to suggest. Estoppel is an extremely fact-sensitive theory that requires
individualized application on a case-by-case basis. The estoppel-for-one-is-estoppel-forall rule implicitly suggested by BRAVE is simply not supported by Utah law or sound
policy. Second, BRAVE failed to present evidence at trial and to marshal the evidence
on appeal supporting each of the elements of judicial and equitable estoppel. Third,
BRAVE did not assert the issue of estoppel in its pleadings, in its trial memorandum or in
the pre-trial order, which did not include the issue of estoppel. Therefore, the issue of
estoppel has been waived.

Fourth, BRAVE's contention that the referability of the

Development Agreement was an "affirmative" claim not properly raised by the pleadings
18
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is without merit due to, inter alia, BRAVE's open court stipulation that referability was
the central issue for trial.
BRAVE's challenge to the adequacy of the notice provided for the April 2, 2007
meeting rings hollow because the notice was legally sufficient and, in fact, BRAVE had
actual notice of and participated in that meeting. BRAVE was not precluded from timely
pursuing a referendum by any alleged notice deficiencies and actual notice is
constitutionally adequate.
BRAVE contends the trial court erred in concluding that the Development
Agreement approved by Ordinance 2007-04 was not referable under Marakis because it
was within the general purpose and policy of existing Beaver County zoning ordinances
and because it did not represent a material variance from the comprehensive plan.
However, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed because, inter alia, BRAVE has
failed to marshal any evidence demonstrating that it was clearly erroneous. BRAVE also
fails to identify what it contends the general purpose and policy of the Beaver County
zoning ordinances was, let alone how the Development Agreement allegedly departed
from it. And, as the trial court properly found, the Development Agreement proposed
nothing of substance that had not already been planned and, in some instances, approved
for the area by prior owners acting under existing Beaver County ordinances. In short,
BRAVE failed to carry its heavy burden of demonstrating that the trial court's application
of Marakis was clearly erroneous.
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ARGUMENT
L

THE LANDOWNERS WERE NOT ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING AT
TRIAL THAT ORDINANCE 2007-04 WAS "ADMINISTRATIVE" UNDER
THE SUPREME COURT'S MARAKIS TEST FOR REFERENDUM CASES.
The trial court held that Beaver County was judicially estopped from asserting that

Ordinance 2007-04's adoption of the Development Agreement was a non-referable
administrative action under Citizen's Awareness Now v. Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117, 1122
(Utah 1994).

Essentially, Beaver County asserted that Ordinance 2007-04 was

"legislative" for purposes of administrative appeal and judicial review under the County
Land Use, Development, and Management Act ("LUDMA"), Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a101 et seq., but "administrative" for purposes of determining referability under Marakis.
The trial court rejected this distinction, finding that because Beaver County denied
"Plaintiffs the right of administrative review on the ground that its action was
legislative," (R. 1901), Beaver County was estopped from asserting Ordinance 2007-04
was "administrative' under Marakis. Neither BRAVE nor Beaver County appeals this
ruling.
However, the trial court held that the Landowners, being a separate party, were not
automatically bound by Beaver County's estoppel, (R. at 1901 n.14), and that there was
no evidence presented to establish an independent claim of estoppel against the
Landowners.

(R. 1901-02.)

The trial court also held that "[b]ecause the amended

complaints of both sets of Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare that Ordinance 2007-04 will
not take affect pending the Beaver County citizens' exercise of their constitutional right
to referendum, the Court finds it reasonable to permit Intervenors to raise the issue of
20
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whether the law is even referable." (R. at 1902 n. 15.) BRAVE appeals these findings.
But as the following subsections demonstrate, this Court should affirm the trial court's
ruling that the Landowners are not estopped from asserting that the Development
Agreement approved by Ordinance 2007-04 is "administrative" and non-referable.
A.

The Landowners are not bound by Beaver County's estoppel.

The trial court correctly concluded that the successful assertion of estoppel against
one defendant does not automatically apply to all co-defendants. (R. at 1902 n.14 (citing
United States v. San Francisco, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 29986 (9th Cir. 1992);
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Herrington, 752 F. Supp. 1082, 1087 (D.D.C. 1990)).) This
is particularly true when a co-defendant is an intervenor under Rule 24(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure like the Landowners. To become an intervenor, a party must
first demonstrate that their interest "is not 'adequately represented by existing parties.'"
Beacham v. Fritzi Realty Corp., 2006 UT App 35, ^j 7, 131 P.3d 271 (quoting Utah R.
Civ. Pro. 24(a)). Thus, a party's intervention presupposes some degree of misalignment
between the interests of the various defendants that would make the rule implied by
BRAVE's analysis—that estoppel against one defendant is an estoppel against all—
unworkable and inequitable in this setting.
The elements of estoppel established by this Court require an individualized
showing of wrongdoing or inequitable conduct based upon the unique conduct of the
party against whom the estoppel is asserted. See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^j 11, 177
P.3d 600 (stating the elements of judicial estoppel); Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.,
2007 UT 28,1f 14, 158 P.3d 1088 (stating the elements of equitable estoppel). Estoppel
21
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also raises issues of "an extremely fact-sensitive nature" that are "applicable to a wide
variety of factual and legal situations" and a broad "variety of fact-intensive
circumstances." Glew, 2007 UT 56 at ^f 19. Thus, the trial court wisely rejected the
invitation to formulate a broad rule whereby the successful assertion of estoppel against
one defendant automatically applies to all co-defendants. This is particularly appropriate
in cases such as this where the Landowners committed none of the acts upon which
estoppel could be based.
B.

There is insufficient evidence to support a claim of estoppel
against the Landowners.
1.

BRAVE fails to marshal the evidence.

As mentioned, estoppel is an extremely "fact-sensitive" and "fact-intensive"
analysis that this Court has stated "weighs heavily against lightly substituting our
judgment for that of the trial court." Glew, 2007 UT 56 at ^f 19. Accordingly, the trial
court's factual finding that "Plaintiffs have presented the Court with no basis for
concluding that Intervenors are ... estopped from asserting that the County's adoption of
Ordinance 2007-04 was an administrative action," (R. at 1901-02), should be granted
broad deference and left undisturbed unless clearly erroneous. Additionally, BRAVE
should be required to marshal all the evidence to successfully challenge this finding.
"Utah's appellate courts have been clear on the burden an appellant must meet
when challenging a trial court's findings of fact." Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d
602, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact
on appeal, 6[a]n appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then
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demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support
as to be "against the clear weight of the evidence," thus making them "clearly
erroneous.'"" Id. (citations omitted). "'If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the
appellate court assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial court and
proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the
application of that law in the case.'" Id. (quoting Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199
(Utah 1991)). To "marshal the evidence" requires more than just "merely selecting]
facts from trial that are most favorable to [appellant's] position, and then rearguing]
those facts to this court on appeal." Id.
BRAVE failed to do even this. Its brief is virtually devoid of any discussion of the
five elements of judicial estoppel, see Orvis, 2008 UT 2, ^ 11, or the three elements of
equitable estoppel, see Youngblood, 2007 UT 28, ^f 14, let alone a marshaling of all the
pertinent evidence pertaining to these elements as applied to the Landowners.4 The trial
court found that BRAVE presented no evidence or insufficient evidence to sustain a
finding of estoppel against the Landowners. BRAVE's failure to marshal forces this
Court to either assume that the record was insufficient to support the trial court's finding

4

For example, BRAVE argues "to the extent the trial court's footnote implies that
CPB/Mount Holly did not join in Beaver County's position that Ordinance No. 2007-04
is legislative, that implication is at odds with the court's own findings," (Appellant's Br.
at 36), without marshaling precisely where in the record this contention is supported by
evidence, let alone the precise finding BRAVE references. Similarly, BRAVE argues,
"the rationale appears to be that CPB/Mount Holly supposedly did not take the same
position as Beaver County prior to litigation" but "the court's detailed factual findings are
to the contrary," (Appellant's Br. at 39)—again, without citing to what findings it was
referencing let alone where evidence in the record supporting or contradicting those
findings can be found.
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or to marshal the evidence itself. This makes it nearly impossible for this Court to
determine whether the trial court's finding is so lacking in support as to be clearly
erroneous. Consequently, the Court should assume the record supports the trial court's
findings and affirm on that basis.
2.

There is no evidence to support a finding of judicial estoppel against
the Landowners.

"The elements of judicial estoppel are: (1) the prior and subsequent litigation
involve the same parties or their privies; (2) the prior and subsequent litigation involve
the same subject matter; (3) the prior position was 'successfully maintained'; and (4) the
party seeking judicial estoppel has relied upon the prior testimony 'and changed his
position by reason of it.'" Orvis, 2008 UT 2 at ^f 11. The Utah Court of Appeals has
required a fifth element, which requires the party "seeking to invoke the judicial estoppel
doctrine" to demonstrate that "the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought must
have exhibited bad faith." Id. at n.l (quoting Orvis v. Johnson, 2006 UT App 394, ^ 15,
146P.3d886).
The trial court correctly concluded there was no evidence demonstrating the
Landowners were parties to BRAVE's administrative appeal let alone that they asserted a
prior position that was "successfully maintained" on the administrative appeal. In fact, as
BRAVE concedes, (Br. of Appellant at 40-41 & n. 11), the Landowners were not parties
to BRAVE's administrative appeal. Accordingly, there can be no evidence to support a
finding on the first and third elements of judicial estoppel.
There is also no evidence showing the Landowners (or Beaver County for that
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matter) acted in bad faith.5 While Beaver County attempted to assert that Ordinance
2007-04 was "legislative" for purposes of administrative appeal and judicial review under
LUDMA but "administrative" under the Marakis referability test, its actions can hardly
be characterized as undertaken in "bad faith." Logically, Beaver County would have
wanted its actions to be characterized as "legislative" for purposes of judicial review
under LUDMA, (R. at 27 n. 20), so that, upon review, it would be entitled to the more
lenient and deferential judicial standard of review applicable to "legislative" as opposed
to "administrative" actions under LUDMA. See, e.g., Bradley v. Payson City Corp.,
2003 UT 16, 70 P.3d 47 (applying the highly-deferential "reasonably debatable" standard
to legislative actions and discussing distinctions between the less deferential standard of
review for administrative versus legislative actions).
It is important to observe, however, that the analysis of whether an action is
"administrative" or "legislative" for purposes of administrative appeal and judicial review
under LUDMA is not coterminous with whether an action is "administrative" or
"legislative" under Marakis. For example, in Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245,
251 n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the Utah Court of Appeals acknowledged the general rule
that, in the standard LUDMA-based administrative appeal/judicial review context, a local
5

"Bad faith" in this context appears from the case law to mean that the party
asserting judicial estoppel must show "an affirmative representation" that is false, 3D
Constr. & Dev., LLC v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co., 2005 UT App 307, ^ 12, 117 P.3d
1082 (citing New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 753 (2001)), or some type of
"chicanery," id. (citing Johnson v. Oregon, 141 F.3d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir. 1998)). This
comports with the common law understanding of "bad faith" typically utilized by Utah
courts. See, e.g., Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Zions First Nat'I Bank, 21 Utah 2d 68, 70,
440 P.2d 869, 870 (1968) ("'Bad faith' is the antithesis of good faith and has been
defined in the cases to be when a thing is done dishonestly ....").
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governing body typically "acts within its legislative function when passing a zoning or
rezoning ordinance."

Id.

In contrast, the determination of whether something is

"administrative" or "legislative" for purposes of determining susceptibility to referendum
under Marakis requires a much more searching and fact-intensive analysis, applying each
of the sequential factors outlined in the Marakis decision. Hence, as the court of appeals
has acknowledged, and as local land use experts have concluded, an action can be
"legislative" for purposes of judicial review under LUDMA but "administrative" for
purposes of referability under Marakis (and its progeny):
"In Birdv. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964) the Supreme Court
of Utah termed rezonings 'administrative' for purposes of holding them to
be unfit subjects for referendum. For all other purposes, however,
rezonings in Utah are characterized as legislative."
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 3 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Rathkopfs The Law of Zoning &
Planning § 27A.04[3], at 27A-35 n. 39 (1997)).6
If the Utah courts can treat local zoning actions as "legislative" for one purpose
(e.g., judicial review) and "administrative" for another (e.g., referendum) then the
Landowners (and Beaver County) ought to be allowed the same privilege. At the very
least, a party's assertion of and reliance upon legal distinctions that have been duly

6

By the same token, this distinction between actions that are "legislative" for
purposes of judicial review under LUDMA but "administrative" for purposes of
determining referability under Marakis suggests that the second element of judicial
estoppel—that the prior and subsequent litigation involve the same subject matter—could
not be satisfied, as well. The subject matter in an administrative appeal of a land use
decision does not involve the determination of whether a particular governmental action
is referable to the voters or any of the Marakis factors. Obviously, city and county
councils, county commissions and boards of adjustment are not competent to dictate what
governmental actions do or do not trigger the constitutional right to referendum.
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recognized by the state's appellate courts and well-respected land use experts can hardly
support an argument of a "bad faith" motive.
In short, there was no evidence to support the first three elements of judicial
estoppel and the element of bad faith. And, as shown in subsection LB.3 below, there
was also no evidence of any reliance that would sustain BRAVE in making a reliance
claim. Simply stated, there was no evidence introduced that would support a finding of
judicial estoppel against the Landowners, who had every right to challenge the
referability of Ordinance 2007-04.
3.

There is no evidence to support a finding of equitable estoppel.

To sustain a finding of equitable estoppel BRAVE was required to demonstrate
"first, 'a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim
later asserted'; next, 'reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or not taken
on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or failure to act'; and, third,
'injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or
repudiate such statement, admission, act or failure to act.'"

Youngblood, 2007 UT 28

at U 14 (citations omitted).
As shown above, there was nothing inconsistent about Beaver County's actions
being characterized as "legislative" for one purpose and "administrative" for another
because the administrative-legislative distinction operates differently in the LUDMA
administrative appeals context than it does under Marakis. Moreover, for purposes of
any estoppel claim (judicial or otherwise), there was no evidence of reasonable and
detrimental reliance by BRAVE on an allegedly inconsistent statement by the
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Landowners (or Beaver County for that matter) that Ordinance 2007-04 was "legislative."
Nor could there be.
First, as demonstrated above, BRAVE should have been aware of the principal
that "the Supreme Court of Utah [has] termed rezonings 'administrative' for purposes of
holding them to be unfit subjects for referendum" but u[f]or all other purposes ...
rezonings in Utah are characterized as legislative." Smith Inv. Co., 958 P.2d at 251 n.6.
Second, as this Court has made abundantly clear, labels that Beaver County or the
Landowners may have given to Ordinance No. 2007-04 are irrelevant to a determination
of referability. "The formal label of a city council's action is not determinative; courts
must look to the substance of the city council's action to determine if it is legislative or
administrative." Low v. City of Monticello, 2002 UT 90, \ 24, 54 P.3d 1153. Accord,
Keigley v. Bench, 90 Utah 569, 63 P.2d 262, 266 (1936) (quoting 1 McQuillan, Municipal
Corps. (2d Ed.) § 366, at 907). If labels were so powerful, local governments could
easily destroy the power of referendum by the simple expedient of affixing the term
"administrative" to all of their actions.

Thus, the fact that Beaver County or the

Landowners may, at times, have labeled Ordinance No. 2007-04 as "legislative" for
purposes of LUDMA does not make it "legislative" under the Marakis test. Nor does it
provide the basis for any reasonable reliance on the part of BRAVE.
Third, the Landowners, being non-governmental entities without decision-making
powers, were not in a position to grant or take away any rights belonging to BRAVE.
Obviously BRAVE's right to referendum or an administrative appeal did not and could
not hinge on the Landowner's characterization of the Development Agreement as
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administrative or legislative. Consequently, the Landowners were in no position to cause
injury to BRAVE. And, in fact, BRAVE has suffered no injury as a result of the
Landowners' (or even the County's) characterization of the Development Agreement. It
is undisputed that BRAVE has timely filed a land use appeal of Beaver County's decision
to the district court pursuant to LUDMA and that this appeal is still pending below
(despite the trial court's ruling on referability and this interlocutory appeal). It is also
undisputed that BRAVE timely filed its referendum petition and was not precluded or
even discouraged from doing so by any representations or statements of the Landowners.
And there is no evidence that BRAVE would not have sought referendum had Beaver
County or the Landowners labeled its actions as "administrative" for purposes of judicial
review. In short, any claim of harm or injury resulting to BRAVE as a result of the
Landowners' alleged characterization of the Development Agreement as "legislative"
does not survive scrutiny. There is simply no evidence of harm to BRAVE as a result of
the Landowners' actions. Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that there was
no evidence to support a claim of estoppel against the Landowners.
C.

BRAVE failed to preserve the issue of estoppel below and/or
waived it.

"It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from
'if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though
such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling
or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on
appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed
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on by the lower court.'" Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, If 10, 52 P.3d 1158 (quoting
Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, f 18, 29 P.3d 1225) (additional citations omitted); see
also Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998); Limb v. Federated Milk
Producers Ass'n, 23 Utah 2d 222, 225-26 n. 2, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n. 2 (1969); 5 CJ.S.
Appeal & Error § 714 (1993). The alternative ground must be apparent on the record and
sustainable by the factual findings of the trial court. "[T]he court ... must then determine
whether the facts as found by the trial court are sufficient to sustain the decision of the
trial court on the alternate ground." Bailey, 2002 UT 58 at \ 20; see also Hill v. Seattle
First Nafl Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992) ("[A]ny rationale for affirming a
decision must find support in the record.").
The trial court found as follows:
The parties stipulated in open court at a June 13, 2007, hearing that
an expedited trial would be held on June 21-22, 2007, to address the
following issues:
a.
Was the notice provided for the public meeting held on April
2, 2007, proper?
b.
Was the May 10, 2007, notice of the adoption of Ordinance
2007-04 proper?
c.
Is Ordinance 2007-04 subject to a referendum vote under the
standard set forth in Citizen's Awareness Now v. Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117
(Utah 1994)?
d.
If Ordinance 2007-04 is subject to a referendum vote, does
Ordinance 2007-04 remain in effect or does it not take effect until
completion of a referendum vote?
(R. at 1891.) This stipulation was embodied in a pre-trial order that is reflected in a trial
court minute entry. (R. at 1598-99.)
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n

The issue of estoppel was not asserted in BRAVE's pleadings.

(See R. at 1, 421-

445 & 1632.) It was not asserted in BRAVE's Trial Memorandum.8 (R. at 1632-44.)
And it was not preserved in the above-referenced pre-trial order, which was never
amended either by motion of BRAVE or further order of the trial court.
"Where the pretrial order or report purports to state the issues to be tried, the trial
should be confined to such issues, and other issues should be eliminated from
consideration, in the absence of some good and sufficient reason, and subject to
considerations of fairness and the efficient administration of the trial." 62A Am. Jur. 2d
Pretrial Conference § 67 (2008). "Issues specified at a pretrial conference control the
course of an action and, unless altered by the court, constitute the issues on which the
case is to be tried." Id. "An issue omitted from the pretrial order may be considered
waived." Id.
This Court has long held that "[t]he pretrial order controls the issues of the case
where it is made without objection and no motion is made to change it, unless it is
modified at the trial to prevent a manifest injustice." Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
7

In re Justheim, 824 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("Estoppel must be
pleaded or it is waived.").
8

To be precise, the claim of estoppel was actually never raised by BRAVE.
Rather, it was raised for the first time in the Homeowner Plaintiffs' Trial Memorandum
filed two days before trial. (R. at 1647-1652.) Beaver County and the Landowners
protested that this defense was raised, for the first time, after the stipulated pre-trial order
and just two days before trial. (R. at 1860-65.) Although the trial court noted in its
ruling "that there was no need to raise this defense earlier because until the County filed
its trial memorandum, the County had conceded that its action was legislative," (R. at
1900 n. 11), the same cannot be said for the Landowners, who argued—even in advance
of their becoming a party to the case through intervention—that Ordinance 2007-04 was
administrative and not referable. (R. at 1056-57.)
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Sales, Inc. v. Lords, 23 Utah 2d 152, 153-54, 460 P.2d 321, 322 (1969). Generally
speaking, to demonstrate such a "manifest injustice" requires a showing of "changed or
newly discovered conditions." Id. Accord Citizens Casualty Co. ofN.Y. v. Hackett, 17
Utah 2d 304, 410 P.2d 767 (1966).
In short, the trial court's decision can be affirmed on the basis that the issue of
estoppel was waived due to the fact that it was not included in the stipulated pre-trial
order, which expressly contemplated a trial on the issue of referability under Marakis.
D.

The Landowners never sought affirmative claims.

BRAVE's final attempt to avoid Marakis scrutiny is its claim that "the trial court,
in substance, allowed intervenors to receive a judgment on an affirmative claim that
Ordinance No. 2007-04 is somehow not referable independent of Beaver County" and
that "[t]he trial court committed legal error by allowing an affirmative claim independent
of Beaver County to be asserted for the first time in a post-trial order." (Appellant's Br.
at 38.)

The Landowners respectfully submit, however, that an examination of the

procedural record will illustrate that they did not inject any claims or issues into the
proceeding that had not already been framed by the pleadings.
BRAVE's Amended Complaint sought an order that "Ordinance No. 2007-04
shall have no effect until the referendum filed by the citizens of Beaver County is
completed." (R. at 445.) In their memorandum supporting their motion to dissolve the
temporary restraining order (filed before they were formally allowed to intervene), the
Landowners argued that Ordinance 2007-04 was not referable.

(R. at 1056-57.)

BRAVE's memorandum in opposition to the motion to dissolve argued that Ordinance
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2007-04 was referable. (R. at 1489-93.) Knowing that the Landowners were challenging
referability, BRAVE notified the trial court in a June 6, 2007, telephone conference that
BRAVE would not be filing an objection to the Landowners' motion to intervene. (R. at
1598, 1609-10.) The Landowners filed a proposed amended complaint with their motion
to intervene, denying that Plaintiffs were entitled to a referendum. (R. at 1569, 15771592, 3446, ^45; 5107, 5115-5130, 5115, ^45.) Thereafter, BRAVE stipulated to a trial
on the issue of referability. (R. at 1598-99.) It subsequently filed a trial memorandum
arguing that Ordinance 2007-04 is referable. (R. at 1634-1639.)
This undisputed procedural history demonstrates that there is no merit to
BRAVE's contention that "the trial court, in substance, allowed intervenors to receive a
judgment on an affirmative claim that Ordinance No. 2007-04 is somehow not referable."
(Br. of Appellant at 38.)9 The trial court correctly concluded that an analysis under

9

It must be noted that to the extent BRAVE now contends that intervention was
not warranted (a position BRAVE has clearly waived) this contention is without merit.
Courts across the country have held that landowners and developers such as Mount Holly
and CPB have the right to intervene in land use litigation against a governmental
defendant such as Beaver County where the subject of the litigation involves the use of
the landowners' land. Courts have noted that, in such cases, "the interests of the
proposed intervenors in property and transactions which form the subject matter of the
action, as well as the potential effect of a determination on those interests, are plain"
Town of North Hempstead v. Village of North Hills, 80 F.R.D. 714, 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(emphasis added). So "plain," in fact, that plaintiffs opposing intervention in such land
use cases cannot "seriously dispute that proposed intervenors come within the . . . two
components of the Rule 24(a) test", id. at 716, that require the movant to show "(i) an
interest in the transaction or property; [and] (ii) an impediment in protecting their interest
because of the action," id. at 715. See also Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. State
of Minnesota, 989 F.2d 994, 997-98 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that intervening landowners
"easily" satisfied the interest and impediment of interest requirements of Rule 24(a)(2)
because they owned land and their property values may have been affected by the
outcome of the litigation). Moreover, courts have recognized that the narrower interests
33
4837-9492-6850/CP001 -004

Marakis was necessary to resolve the Landowners' contention that Ordinance 2007-04
was not referable.
II.

ORDINANCE 2007-04 IS NOT REFERABLE UNDER MARAKIS.
This Court created the sequential Marakis test to aid lower courts in determining

when local

land use decisions are "legislative" and, therefore,

referable

or

"administrative" and, therefore, non-referable. See Marakis, 873 P.2d at 1123. Under
the test, there are essentially four sequential layers of scrutiny that must be undertaken.
See id. at 1125-26. First is the adequacy of notice. If notice is found to be adequate, then
the party seeking a referendum must demonstrate the following: that the challenged
zoning action was outside the general purpose and policy of the original enactment; next
that it was a material departure from the general plan; and, finally, that voter participation
is appropriate. See id. Failure to demonstrate a single element is fatal because the
analysis "must be undertaken as a sequential process, addressing each policy element in
the order and manner identified in [the Marakis] opinion." Id. at 1123.10
The trial court held that the notices surrounding the enactment of Ordinance 200704 were adequate and that Ordinance 2007-04 did not alter the general purpose and
policy of the Beaver County zoning ordinance. (R. at 1891-98 & 1916-23.) Although the

of a private intervenor may not be adequately represented by an existing government
defendant. See, e.g., Trbovich v. Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1972); Sierra
Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (5th Cir. 1994).
10

BRAVE ignores this directive in its brief by conflating the "general purpose and
policy" analysis with its "material variance" analysis, making it impossible for the
Landowners to determine which arguments go to which elements.
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Court was not required to do so (because the Marakis analysis "must be undertaken as a
sequential process," Marakis, 873 P.2d at 1123), it also held that even if Ordinance 200704 was outside the general purpose and policy of the Beaver County zoning ordinance, it
was nevertheless non-referable because it did not constitute a material departure from
Beaver County's general plan and basic zoning law. (R. at 1923-24.) BRAVE appeals
these rulings.
However, as the following arguments demonstrate, the trial court's rulings were
correct and should be affirmed.

After briefly discussing the policy underpinnings of

Marakis, the following subsections discuss the trial court's findings with regard to each
of the relevant Marakis elements.
A.

History, purpose and background of Marakis.

While the fundamental nature of the constitutional right to referendum in Utah
cannot be disputed and its importance cannot be overstated, it is not an unlimited or
unbounded

right.

The Utah Constitution, itself, provides that appropriate limiting

parameters on that right may be established. For example, Article VI, Section 1 of the
Utah Constitution provides that the local referendum right may be regulated by the Utah
Legislature "in the numbers, under the conditions, in the manner, and within the time
provided by statute."

Utah Const. Art. VI, § l(2)(b).

Thus, if proponents of a

referendum are to subject an ordinance to a referendum vote, they must do so "as
provided by statute." Id. § l(2)(b)(ii).
"Pursuant to this grant of authority, the legislature has outlined by statute the
mechanisms by which the people can exercise their constitutionally guaranteed local
35
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referendum right." Mouty, 2005 UT 41 at ^f 18. Under the current statutory scheme, the
legislature has excluded "individual property zoning decisions" from the definition of
"local law[s]" that are referable. Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-101(10)(b). This "was an
attempt to codify [this Court's] determination that administrative zoning matters are not
referable to the voters as a matter of constitutional right while legislative zoning matters
are referable." Mouty, 2005 UT 41 at \ 22. Thus, making the determination of whether a
governmental action is a non-referable "individual property zoning decision[]" under
section 20A-7-101(10)(b) of the code "involves applying the Marakis test, which was
designed to answer such questions." Id. at ^ 24.
In Mouty,u this Court made it clear that, in addition to creating guidelines for
resolution of the often-blurry distinction between "legislative" and "administrative"
actions, Marakis has substantial policy underpinnings that reveal its intended purpose as
a sifting mechanism designed to restrict and limit the exercise of the local referendum
right to appropriate circumstances. "[W]e are cognizant that other factors counseled in
favor of creating the administrative-legislative distinction. For example, we have been
hesitant to hold that an unqualified referendum right extends to municipal considerations
involving necessarily complex issues, as the resolution of such matters may be best left to

11

The Landowners note that the Beaver County Commission is empowered with
both administrative and legislative authority. Thus, the rationale of Mouty has no
application to the case at bar. As this Court is aware, the Mouty case did not turn on an
analysis under Marakis but on the unrelated rationale that because Sandy City had
expressly decided to operate under a mayor-council form o r city government, the
Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act ("OFMGA") required "a strict separation
of governmental powers, by which the city council is foreclosed from undertaking any
action that is not, by definition, legislative." Mouty, 2005 UT 41, 122 P.3d 521.
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the mechanisms generally employed by municipal governments." Id. at ^ 32. Another
concern underlying previous opinions "is the potential for havoc in ... land use policy
should an unchecked referendum power be given full freedom to operate." Id. at ^J 33.
The "gravity" of these, and other policy concerns, cannot be discounted. Id. at ^j 35.
Land use decisions often require the technical assistance and special expertise of
geotechnical engineers, land use planners, experts in urban design and engineering, soils
experts, water experts, lawyers and other highly-trained experts so that sound land use
policies can be formulated and implemented to best protect the health, safety and welfare
of local residents while, at the same time, not trammeling upon the private property rights
of the applicant.

The modern advent of development agreements has become a

particularly useful way of achieving these often conflicting objectives. See, e.g., Utah
Code Ann. § 17-27a-102(l)(b).
12

There are other policy concerns to consider when defining the parameters of the
local referendum right, such as the appropriate separation and allocation of the legislative
power between and among the people of the state and local voters. As this Court
recognized in Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty Co., 3 Utah 2d 1, 3, 277 P.2d 805, 808
(1954), the right to local legislation in the context of land use cannot be allowed to
override statewide concerns and policies, as reflected in statewide land use statutes such
as LUDMA. Allowing local voters to do an "end run" around the zoning policies and
procedures mandated by the people of the state (acting through their state representatives)
by initiating a local referendum would "in effect" be "attacking collaterally the very
[state] statute under which they claim their power" to act on matters of zoning to begin
with. Id. Also, allowing voters to legislatively veto development agreements that they
do not like raises obvious concerns under the Contracts Clauses of the Utah and United
States Constitutions. See, e.g., Low v. City of Monticello, 2002 UT 90 atfflf19-22 ("The
contracts clauses' prohibitions of the passage of laws that impair the obligations of
contracts extend to any form of legislative action, including referenda and other direct
action by the people."). At the very least, it chills the use of development agreements,
which public policy should favor because they are an extremely useful way of
eliminating disputes and allocating rights and responsibilities as between developers and
local land use authorities.
37
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In the Marakis decision this Court cautions against an unlimited right to
referendum:
If cities are to function efficiently, citizens must recognize that there are
certain governmental areas in which the need for continual change
necessitates an expeditious means of decision making.
Otherwise,
communities will be subject to the undesirable phenomenon of city
government by referenda, an inefficient and often arbitrary system that
virtually guarantees piecemeal land development.
Marakis, 873 P.2d at 1125.
In other contexts, this Court has been reluctant to question the often technicallydriven decisions of local land use authorities and there is a very strong tradition that local
representatives' "land use decisions are entitled to a great deal of deference." Springville
Citizens for a Better Cmty. v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, ^ 23, 979 P.2d 332.
Accordingly, in the land use context, "the courts generally will not so interfere with the
actions of a city council unless its action is outside of its authority or is so wholly
discordant to reason and justice that its action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary
and thus in violation of the complainant's rights." Id. (quoting Triangle Oil, Inc. v. North
Salt Lake Corp., 609 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Utah 1980)).
There is also a very strong legislative tradition of affording deference and
autonomy to the people's elected representatives in the area of land use. For example,
under LUDMA
(3) (a) The courts shall:
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the
authority of this chapter is valid; and
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation
is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
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Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-801(3)(a).

This same degree of deference is statutorily

mandated for Utah municipalities, as well. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)(a).
All of this is not to say that the right to local referenda does not exist. It does.
And in the areas where it does exist, it is a fundamental right. The Landowners readily
concede this point. However, the particularly narrow area of local land use ordinances
amounting to "individual property zoning decisions," Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7101(10)(b), like the ordinance approving the Development Agreement in this case, is not
one of those areas.
B.

Application of the sequential Marakis test to the facts of this case.
1.

Notice.

The first step in the Marakis analysis requires BRAVE to demonstrate that notice
of the relevant action was inadequate. The Landowners hereby join in the arguments,
authorities and citations to the record contained within the Beaver County Appellees'
Brief. The Landowners also endorse the trial court's reasoning. The Landowners would
add that the overarching purpose of the Marakis notice prong is to ensure that would-be
voters have adequate notice of an ordinance's enactment "so that they may institute
referendum procedures promptly." Marakis, 873 P.2d at 1123.
There is no claim or issue in this case, as there was in Bissland v. Bankhead, 2007
UT 86, 171 P.3d 430 or Low, 2004 UT 90, that the referendum proponents were
prohibited from timely complying with the deadlines set forth in the Utah Election Code
due to allegedly inadequate notice. In fact, the evidence introduced at trial demonstrated
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that BRAVE had actual notice

of every hearing, that the hearings were well-attended,

that there was significant media attention, and that drafts of the proposed Development
Agreement were timely posted on the County's website for all to view.
Here, as in Bissland, "[t]he ordinance appears to have taken no one by surprise,"
2007 UT 86 at Tj 3, especially not BRAVE, which organized a calling network to keep
local citizens informed about the Landowners' development and had representatives in
attendance at all of the relevant meetings. (R. at 2093, pp. 65-66, 73-75, 88:19-24.)
Indeed, BRAVE's president testified that BRAVE "had called a great percentage" of the
people who showed up at the public hearings and public meetings. (R. at 209, p. 74:2.)
Inasmuch as BRAVE had actual notice of all the relevant meetings, including the passage
of Ordinance 2007-04, and timely petitioned for a referendum vote BRAVE cannot
legitimately claim that it was adversely affected by any alleged notice failure.
2.

General Purpose and Policy.

Having resolved the issue of notice, the next step in the sequential Marakis
analysis requires an assessment of whether the Development Agreement adopted by

13

See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-316, 70
S.Ct. 652, 657-59, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) (impliedly holding that actual notice satisfied due
process); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798-800, 103 S.Ct. 2706,
2711-2712, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983) (same). "[I]f a party receives actual notice that
apprises it of the pendency of the action and affords an opportunity to respond, the due
process clause is not offended." Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs., 72 F.3d 246, 254
(2d Cir.1995) (citing United States v. One 1987 Jeep Wrangler, 972 F.2d 472, 482 (2d
Cir.1992) (summarizing Mullane and Mennonite Bd. of Missions as "impliedly holding
that actual notice satisfied demands of due process")); see also Lopes v. United States,
862 F.Supp. 1178, 1188 (S.D.N.Y.1994) ("... [WJhere there is actual notice there is no
due process violation.").
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Ordinance 2007-04 fell "within the general purpose and policy of the original ordinance."
Marakis, 873 P.2d at 1124. "When applying this element, the trial court must first
determine the general purpose and policy of the original ... zoning category" and then
"consider whether the cumulative result of the zoning change at issue ... falls within the
general purpose and policy of the original ... designation." Id. "[I]f the zoning change
does not comport with the general purpose and policy of the original ordinance, a
legislative presumption attaches and the trial court must then consider the final two
elements." Id. This "admittedly fact-intensive analysis," Mouty, 2005 UT 41 at ^f 24,
required the trial court to consider "a variety of factors, including the plain language of
the ordinance, council meeting minutes, the intent of the enacting authority ... and any
other reliable and relevant evidence," Marakis, 873 P.2d at 1124.
The trial court considered all of these factors and concluded that the general
purpose and policy of the overall zoning scheme applicable to the subject property and
that existed in Beaver County prior to the Development Agreement was "(a) to allow for
diversification of land uses as they relate to each other in a physical and environmental
arrangement (b) to allow for any combination of uses that may be determined by the
Planning Commission to be in harmony with each other according to a designated and
approved development plan (c) to permit flexibility through the use of planned and
integrated designs and (d) to serve existing and promote new quality growth by pursuing
timely and equitable strategies to provide financing for basic infrastructure through,
among other things, the use of development agreements." (R. at 1918.) And, according
to the trial court, the Development Agreement approved by Ordinance 2007-04 did not
41
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detract from this general purpose and policy but merely implemented it.
BRAVE, of course, disagrees, but utterly fails to address the "general" purpose
and policy of the original enactment. Instead BRAVE merely catalogues a series of
minute instances of alleged discrepancies and differences between the existing zoning
texts and the provisions of the Development Agreement.

But this analysis is not

consistent with the general purpose and policy prong ofMarakis.
Marakis does not take the minute, granular view of zoning decisions that BRAVE
has urged throughout trial and appeal. Marakis neither requires nor allows the Court to
compare or analyze microscopic specifics.

Marakis requires

a macro—not

microscopic—view of the land use action. It is the "general purpose and policy of the
original zoning ordinance," id. at 1124 (emphasis added), that the Court must first assess.
In other words, the Court must look at the mosaic, not the individual shards of glass; the
snow-capped mountains, not the snowflakes; the beach and not the grains of sand. This
"general purpose and policy" analysis is what allows the trial court to determine whether,
after the zoning action at issue, the general purposes and policies of the zoning scheme
remain intact despite the specific calibrations, adjustments, amendments, exceptions and
variances at the granular level.

After all, how can society avoid the "undesirable

phenomenon of [local] government by referenda," id. at 1125, if details rather than
concepts are decided by voters.
BRAVE offers the Court nothing to aid it in applying this aspect of the Marakis
test. Indeed, it fails to even identify what it thinks the general purpose and policy of the
original zoning enactment is, which is fatal to its claim that there was a deviation
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therefrom. One is necessarily left to conclude that BRAVE does not challenge the trial
court's general purpose and policy findings and conclusions because, if there is a
differing general purpose and policy behind Beaver County's zoning ordinance, BRAVE
has altogether failed to identify it.
Aside from failing to identify its competing version of the general purpose and
policy of the Beaver County Zoning Ordinance, BRAVE fails to marshal any evidence
that the Development Agreement was not within the general purpose and policy found by
the trial court. As the trial court correctly found, the specific stated purpose of the P zone
is, "[t]o allow the diversification of land uses as they relate to each other in a physical and
environmental arrangement, at the same time, ensuring compliance with the provisions of
this ordinance." (Pis. Trial Ex. 25, p. 92, § 10.23.010; R. at 1902.) The "Purpose"
section of the P zone also states that it "is only to be used in conjunction with the Planned
Unit Development regulations." (Id; R. at 1902-03.)
In turn, the stated purpose of the Planned Unit Development chapter of the zoning
ordinance is to "allow diversification in the relationship of various uses and structures to
their sites and to permit more flexibility in the use of such sites." (Id., p. 40, § 10.09.010
(emphasis added).)14

In addition to the "flexibility" and variability required by the

14

The definition of a "planned unit development" is an "integrated design for
development of residential, commercial, or industrial uses, or combinations of such uses,
in which one (1) or more of the regulations, other than use regulations, of the district in
which the development is to be situated is waived or varied to allow flexibility... in
accordance with an approved plan and imposed general requirements as specified in this
Chapter." (Id, p. 40, § 10.09.020 (emphasis added); R. at 1903-04, 1917.) It is
noteworthy that in a "planned unit development" uses that are "permitted" are "those uses
which are permitted in the planned district or other zoning district in which the Planned
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specific zoning enactments applicable to the subject property, the General Plan, itself,
calls for the "need for aggressive economic development" and "quality growth," the need
to make use of "plans and development agreements," and the policy to "modify its landuse

ordinances to accommodate

the differing

needs

and

limitations

of

...

mountain/recreation residential subdivisions." (R. at 1917-18; Pis. Tr. Ex. 34 at H-6, E67 & P&P 71.) Ordinance 2007-04 simply approved the Development Agreement. And,
as the trial court correctly concluded, "the intent of Ordinance 2007-04 and the
Development Agreement was to implement the existing zoning scheme." (R. 1915.)
BRAVE has not marshaled any evidence to the contrary.
BRAVE also overlooks the fact that Ordinance 2007-04 is not a general law that
applies on a county-wide basis. Rather it simply adopts a Development Agreement that
applies to a tract of land owned by a single set of private owners.15 Aside from the scope

Unit Development is located" after "review and approval of the Planning Commission."
(Pis.' Tr. Ex. 25 at p. 42, § 10.09.050.) In essence, then, the uses that are permitted
constitute whatever uses are allowed or approved after review by the Planning
Commission. (Id.) The uses contemplated by the Landowners, such as commercial
recreation, condominiums, recreation equipment, recreation, or "other uses that may be
determined by the Planning Commission to be in harmony with each other according to
the designated and approved development plan," were permitted as conditional uses in
the Planned District Zone. (See Pis.' Tr. Ex. 25 at p. 92, § 10.23.040.) Those and other
uses were proposed, reviewed and approved by the Planning Commission and/or the
County Commission in the context of the Development Agreement and thereby became
"uses which are permitted in the planned district." (Pis. Tr. Ex. 25 at 42, § 10.09.050.)
15

The Landowners note that the General Plan embodies a concern that the vast
majority of land in the County is government-owned, that private lands are scarce and,
therefore, government regulation of them should be reduced. According to the General
Plan
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of coverage, permanency is also relevant to the issue of whether the Development
Agreement approved by Ordinance 2007-04 represents a departure from the general
purpose and policy of the original zoning enactment and is, therefore, "legislative." By
BRAVE's own admission, the Development Agreement approved by Ordinance No.
2007-04 is not even permanent in nature. (Appellant's Br. at 51.) It has a ten-year
duration with the option to extend for an additional ten years. (Appellant's Br. at 51.)
These limitations in scope and duration weigh heavily against the Development
Agreement being considered legislative.
But even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Development Agreement is
in all other respects a piece of local legislation that permanently and completely amends
the Beaver County zoning laws on a county-wide basis in all the particulars complained
of by BRAVE, that finding would still not establish that it was "legislative" under the
Marakis test. BRAVE proceeds upon the erroneous assumption that any ordinance that
amends existing law is subject to referendum.16

But what makes a zoning action

[t]he "Common bond" that will take The County Commission as well as
future Commission's [sic] to the year 2020 is the best utilization of Beaver
County's private land which only constitutes 6.1 percent of the County's
entire land base. It will be important to the elected, as well as appointed
officials to strive at minimizing the limitations resulting from the high
percentages of Federal and State Lands, by not diminishing development
interest and quality growth.
(Pis.' Tr. Ex. 34 at H-6 (emphasis added).)
16

BRAVE's premise that any amendments or changes to existing law by
ordinance constitutes legislative action is inconsistent with Utah law, which holds that
"ordinances implementing the basic zoning enactment, such as by exceptions and
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referable is if all of the Marakis criteria are satisfied, not whether it amends or changes
existing zoning law. As the trial court correctly concluded:
[Tjhere is no question that Ordinance 2007-04 amends the Zoning
Ordinance and the Subdivision Ordinance with regard to the property
covered by the Development Agreement. However, the mere amendment
of the governing zoning law does not necessarily equate to legislative
action. Were that the case, the Marakis analysis would be unnecessary.
(R. at 36 n. 27.)
Plaintiffs mistake the procedure for the substance. The original
enactment of a zoning ordinance is usually legislative because it usually 1)
is outside the purpose and policy of the existing zoning ordinance 2)
constitutes a material variance, and 3) is an appropriate matter for voter
participation. In other words, it is usually legislative under an analysis of
the substantive factors identified in Marakis, and not merely because the
enacting authority chose to label it an ordinance.
(R. at 3 I n . 23.)
The trial court was correct. By focusing first on the general purpose and policy of
the original zoning ordinance, the Marakis analysis presupposes that non-referable
amendments and changes to existing law can and will exist. What makes something
"legislative" under Marakis—and therefore referable—is not a catalogue of amendments
and changes but actual application of all the Marakis factors. Consequently, as the Utah
Court of Appeals has previously recognized, Marakis scrutiny means that local land use
actions that, for all other intents and purposes, are "legislative" may, nonetheless be
"administrative" under Marakis. See Smith Inv. Co, 958 P.2d at 251 n.6.
Even if the Landowners were to concede, for purposes of argument, that the

variances, would generally be administrative acts not subject to referendum." Wilson v.
Manning, 657 P.2d 251, 253 (Utah 1982).
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Development Agreement approved by Ordinance 2007-04 is, for all intents and purposes,
a new piece of legislation that amends Beaver County's zoning ordinance in the
particulars asserted by BRAVE, that still would not relieve BRAVE of its burden to
demonstrate that these specific provisions of the Development Agreement do violence to
the general purpose and policy of Beaver County's zoning ordinance. And BRAVE has
utterly failed to marshal any evidence to support its claim that the general purpose and
policy of the Beaver County zoning ordinance, as found by the trial court, was changed
or altered by the Development Agreement.
In short, BRAVE's sand-sifting analysis does nothing to change the big picture.
The general purpose and policy of Beaver County's zoning ordinance both before and
after the Development Agreement approved by Ordinance 2007-04 remains the same.
Because the zoning change falls within the general purpose and policy of the original
ordinance, it constitutes an "administrative" change for purposes of the Marakis analysis
and is not subject to referendum." Marakis, 873 P.2d at 1124. This Court should not set
I n

aside the trial court's correctly applied Marakis analysis.
3.

Material Variance.

If the general purpose and policy prong of Marakis takes a telescopic view by
examining general purposes and policies, then the material variance prong of Marakis
takes a 10,000-foot aerial view of the zoning action by zooming out from consideration
•J n

BRAVE, almost as a side note, claims that the Development Agreement
violates various provisions of state law; but this is not relevant to a referability analysis
under Marakis and is not an issue on appeal. In fact, the legality of Ordinance 2007-04
under LUDMA or other provisions of state law is one of the interlocutory issues
remaining below, which the trial court has not yet addressed.
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of the general policies of particular zoning ordinances to the more abstract focus of a
local government's general and comprehensive plan.

This is where the degree of

difficulty for BRAVE increases dramatically because "the material variance element
essentially asks trial courts to make a factual determination as to the magnitude or
importance of the disputed zoning change."

Marakis, 873 P.2d at 1124 (emphasis

added). Under this fact-intensive prong, BRAVE was required to show that the zoning
action essentially introduced a new planning concept or altered the landscape of planning
policy in Beaver County in ways not contemplated by the General Plan. See id. at 1124-25.
As the Marakis court stated:
The trial court must decide whether the zoning change "constitute^]
such a material variation from the basic zoning law of the governmental
unit as to constitute ... the making of a new law rather than merely ...
implementing the comprehensive plan and adjusting it to current
conditions.'" . . . . Thus a minor change which merely implements the
comprehensive plan and adjusts it to current conditions rebuts the
legislative presumption and requires the court to rule that the change was
administrative.
Id. at 1124-25 (emphasis added). Thus, to be "material" under Marakis, the change in the
zoning landscape must be noticeable from an even higher analytical altitude—i.e., it must
alter or depart from the more abstract and fundamental concepts typically embodied in
the comprehensive plan.
In this regard, the trial court correctly concluded as follows:
[T]he extent of the zoning changes intended and achieved by the enactment
of Ordinance 2007-04 consisted of various waivers or variations of P Zone
regulations, as expressly contemplated by § 10.09.020 of the Zoning
Ordinance, and of various adjustments to approval processes and timing.
Moreover, some of the property in question previously had been
granted concept plan approval by the Planning Commission for uses similar
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in density and nature to that proposed under the Development Agreement,
with the exception of Intervenors' proposed golf course. A portion of the
property had previously been used as a ski resort and had previously been
conceptually approved for residential development with allowed densities
greater than the densities contemplated by the Development Agreement.
As a result, the Court finds that any variance effectuated by Ordinance
2007-04's passage was not material.
(R. at 1923-24.)
There was simply no evidence presented demonstrating that the Development
Agreement created a shift in planning policy of the magnitude required to constitute a
material variance under Marakis.

Indeed, as the trial court found, the undisputed

evidence showed that the Landowners were proposing precisely the same types of uses
(with the exception of a golf course) that had previously been approved in concept by
Beaver County or that had previously been allowed by Beaver County at lower densities.
(R. at 1923-24.)
The Development Agreement approved by Ordinance 2007-04 is consistent with
the General Plan, which reflects "the County's commitment to quality Public and Private
Growth through their elected and appointed officials." (Pis.' Trial Exhibit 34 at H-6
(emphasis added).) 18 The Development Agreement approved by Ordinance 2007-04 is

18

BRAVE argues that part H-5 of the General Plan "is strongly worded to protect
local interests from 'the actions of those whose residences lie beyond the county but whose
ambitions are directed at denying individual and local determination. These practices
and policies of such outsiders constitute cultural genocide"" (Br. of Appellant at 53
(emphasis in original).) BRAVE further claims, "[t]he essential purpose of the plan is that
it 'offers a means by which the citizens of Beaver County can be empowered in all
matters of land use.'" (Id. (emphasis in original)). BRAVE then states that "[t]he
referendum power is entirely consistent with this strongly stated policy." (Id.)
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consistent with the General Plan because it presents a planned, detailed, comprehensive
set of guidelines and regulations for the development of a single parcel of privatelyowned property in accordance with anticipated land use patterns, and "Projected land use
is the backbone of the General Plan." (Pis.' Trial Exhibit 34 at P&P-70.)
The Development Agreement approved by Ordinance 2007-04 is consistent with
the General Plan on the issue of adjusting the timing requirement for dedication of water
rights and other timing adjustments set forth therein because the General Plan provides
that "[n]ew subdivisions, if approved, will be required to provide adequate culinary water
and adequate means of sanitary sewage disposal" but that "[tjhe county will modify its
land-use ordinances to accommodate the differing needs and limitations of standard
residential subdivisions and mountain/recreation residential subdivisions." {Id. at P&P71 (emphasis added).)
The Development Agreement approved by Ordinance 2007-04 is consistent with
the General Plan because it simply provides for a way to manage growth and economic
development through the use of a Development Agreement and the General Plan
expressly contemplates a "need for aggressive economic development" and "quality
growth," (R. at 1904; Pis.' Trial Ex. 34 at H-6), and the need to make use of "plans and
development agreements," (R. at 1904-05; Pis.' Trial Ex. 34 at E-67.).

The Landowners agree. But whether or not exercise of the right to referendum is
consistent with the General Plan is not at issue in this case. The issue is whether the
Development Agreement is consistent with the General Plan, and the Development
Agreement does not ban, prohibit or limit referenda in any way, shape or form, nor could
it—it is merely an agreement between two parties and not a piece of legislation.
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Accordingly, assuming for purposes of argument, that Ordinance 2007-04 is an
entirely new piece of legislation that completely alters the general purpose and policy of
Beaver County's zoning ordinance under the first prong of Marakis, and is thereby
presumptively "legislative," the fact that there was no evidence produced at trial showing
how Ordinance 2007-04 materially varied from the General Plan is fatal to BRAVE's
appeal. In short, the trial court heard and saw, firsthand, what the Landowners propose
for this area, compared that to the policies found in the General Plan and what had
previously been allowed by Beaver County, and made the correct factual determination
that no violence has or will be done to the General Plan or its implementation in Beaver
County. Accordingly, this Court should not disturb the trial court's factual findings and
should affirm the trial court's decision.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Landowners respectfully request that the ruling
of the trial court be AFFIRMED.
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